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NOTES
STOLEN ARTWORK: DECIDING OWNERSHIP
IS NO PRETTY PICTURE
ANDREA E. HAYWORTHt
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, where art is no longer mere exhibition
fare but an investment worth millions of dollars, it is a curious
anomaly that our legal system may favor the person who steals a
priceless piece of art over an innocent purchaser who unknowingly
buys it to hang on his living room wall. This tension has not gone
unnoticed, but it remains unresolved. The New York Court of
Appeals acknowledged the problem in its recent decision in Solo-
mon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell.'
The rule in this State is that a cause of action for replevin
against the good-faith purchaser of a stolen chattel accrues when
the true owner makes demand for return of the chattel and the
person in possession of the chattel refuses to return it ....
Although seemingly anomalous, a different rule applies when the
stolen object is in the possession of the thief. In that situation,
the Statute of Limitations runs from the time of the theft, even
if the property owner was unaware of the theft at the time that
it occurred.
The court did not fail to recognize the curiosity of this ar-
rangement. When a thief steals a painting, the statute of limita-
tions begins to run immediately. After the limitations period ex-
pires, the thief is immune to suit and has thereby achieved re-
t The author wishes to thank Professor Richard C. Maxwell of the Duke Universi-
ty School of Law for his guidance and support of this project.
1. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
2. Id. at 429 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court further noted that in a
replevin action against a good-faith purchaser of stolen art, the possession is not consid-
ered wrongful under state law until a demand for possession is made and refused. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 124-28.
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pose.3 By contrast, an innocent purchaser of the same painting is
subject to a number of equitable doctrines that toll the statute of
limitations on the true owner's replevin action. The purchaser's
claim to the painting, for which valuable consideration presumably
has been paid, is determined in light of any number of factors; de-
pending on the jurisdiction, the true owner's exercise of due dili-
gence,4 the fulfillment of the requirements for adverse posses-
sion,5 or the owner's unsuccessful demand for return of possession
may be relevant.6 The innocent purchaser may never actually
achieve repose. In practical terms, therefore, a thief may stand a
better chance of retaining possession of a piece of stolen artwork
than an innocent purchaser!8
3. In New York, the statute that governs actions to recover a stolen chattel man-
dates commencement of proceedings within three years of the time the action accrues.
See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 214(3) (McKinney 1990). The time of accrual is, in fact,
what distinguishes the two scenarios presented in this discussion. New York courts have
held that a cause of action against a thief accrues at the time of the dispossession. See
Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the
statutory period begins to run at the time of the conversion).
4. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869-70 (NJ. 1980) (applying the
discovery rule, previously applicable to medical malpractice actions, to replevin actions for
recovery of stolen art and imposing a duty on the true owner to use all reasonable ef-
forts to locate a stolen piece).
5. Reynolds v. Bagwell, 198 P.2d 215, 216-17 (Okla. 1948) (applying the traditional
test of adverse possession to recovery of stolen chattel and concluding that absent fraud
or concealment by the subsequent possessor, the traditional analysis of ownership result-
ing from expiration of the statutory period applies).
6. In New York, suits against innocent purchasers accrue only when the true owner
makes a demand for possession, and the purchaser refuses to return the property. See,
eg., Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429; Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). Under
this doctrine, the purchaser has little chance of attaining repose because the true owner
may at any time demand possession of the property. Only when the purchaser refuses to
deliver possession does the limitations period begin to run. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at
429.
California has the only statute codifying the specific time at which a cause of ac-
tion accrues for actions to recover stolen artwork. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)
(West Supp. 1993). The statute of limitations requires commencement of proceedings
[w]ithin three years . . . [of a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring any
goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal proper-
ty. The cause of action in the case of theft . .. of any article of ... artistic
significance is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the where-
abouts of the article by the aggrieved party, his or her agent, or the law en-
forcement agency which originally investigated the theft.
Id. While this statute does not foreclose the application of additional equitable doctrines,
such as the discovery rule, see infra text accompanying note 66, it does specifically detail
the point at which the owner's cause of action accrues.
7. See supra note 6.
8. It is outside the scope of this Note to discuss in depth the validity of the policy
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To art collectors, museums, and other victims of art theft, the
uncertainty surrounding the determination of their possessory
rights to pieces of art is far from insignificant. The narrowness of
the issue belies its importance. As art prices have soared, so has
art theft.9 With masterpieces selling for upwards of $50 million
apiece, thieves no doubt see possibilities in such a lucrative busi-
ness.'" The stolen art market has an annual trade estimated at
between $860 million and $2.6 billion;" trafficking in stolen art is
second only to drug trafficking as the most lucrative form of crimi-
nal activity."2
In the first eight months of 1988 (a year in which two Vincent
Van Gogh paintings sold for over $93 million), at least 9000 art
thefts were reported. 3 Without a doubt, the actual incidence of
art theft is even higher. Numerous thefts are never reported be-
cause owners and museums, embarrassed by the breach of security,
fear that collectors will be reluctant to loan their valuable pieces,
considerations involved in the statute of limitations as it applies to thieves. Instead, this
Note focuses on the statute of limitations as it has been applied and modified in regard
to innocent purchasers. Discussion of the limitations period applicable to thieves is includ-
ed to highlight the treatment of innocent purchasers.
9. Renee Graham, Art Stolen from Gardner Museum Was Uninsured: Thieves May
Find the Booty "Too Hot to Handle," BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1990, at 6.
10. Id.; see also Dalya Alberge, Statues Worth £100,000 Stolen from Gallery, THE
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 24, 1992, at 3 (discussing insurance company officials' concern that
the skyrocketing prices fetched by legitimately sold pieces of art were fueling art theft);
Daniel Golden, Hot Art The Billion Dollar Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 1989,
(Magazine) at 63 (Rising art prices and art theft are "intimately related . . . .They are
both part of the general fetishization of works of art that has taken place in society,
particularly in America. Art is no longer priceless, it is priceful. We overvalue art, and
then we're surprised when the chalices are stolen.") (quoting Robert Hughes, art critic
for Time magazine).
11. Kate Dourian, Art Theft to Be Major Problem when Borders Come Down in
1992, REUTERS, Sept. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WVIRES File. The
article notes that Italy loses 245,000 works of art a year to theft, and Britain loses 5,000
paintings annually. It also expresses the concern among police and art experts that the
opening of the borders in Europe would cause an explosion of the illicit trade because of
the ease with which thieves may travel among countries. Id
12. Id
13. Graham, supra note 9, at 6. These figures were obtained from Interpol, an agen-
cy closely connected to investigation of art theft on the international scene in an official
police capacity. Other agencies also take reports of stolen artwork, including the Interna-
tional Federation of Art Research (IFAR). Robert Hughes, A Boston Theft Reflects the
Art World's Turmoil, TIME, Apr. 2, 1990, at 54, 55. Another organization recording re-
ports of art theft is the London-based Art Loss Register (ALR), which charges a fee to
record the theft but allows police free access to the records. ALR also has offices in
New York City. Dourian, supra note 11.
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or have other personal reasons that counsel against reporting.14
Furthermore, almost ninety percent of stolen artwork is never
found.' 5
Since World War II, the United States has been the biggest
market for illegal art. 6 The paltry police resources devoted to
recovery of stolen art in the United States makes the possibility of
recovery bleak. In 1989, only two police officers were employed to
investigate such thefts full time, one in New York City and one in
Los Angeles. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had no agents
exclusively investigating art theft. 7
The delays and obstacles involved in recovery of stolen art
create problems for both purchasers and true owners. In most
cases, true owners do not locate stolen works until the statute of
limitations has long since run on their claims for recovery of the
property. As a result, the statute of limitations historically has
served as a purchaser's primary protection against liability for
replevin of stolen pieces.8 However, courts' application of various
equitable doctrines to modify the statute of limitations has ham-
pered both true owners' and innocent purchasers' understanding of
their respective rights and obligations in dealing with stolen art.
Purchasers are often left in doubt about what protection, if any,
they have against claims for replevin: "[C]ollectors used to ask [art
connoisseurs] ... if something was good. Now they have a pha-
lanx of lawyers telling them whether it's legal . ,, " However,
in its decision in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell,
the New York Court of Appeals adopted an approach, based on
the requirement of a demand to commence the running of the
statute, that offers equity and certainty, is realistic in its expecta-
14. See Golden, supra note 10, at 16.
15. See Hughes, supra note 13, at 55.
16. Alan Riding, French Museum Chief vs. Art Thieves, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1991,
at 13, 15.
17. Golden, supra note 10, at 36.
18. Stephen L. Foutty, Recent Development, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church
of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc- Entrenchment of the Due Diligence
Requirement in Replevin Actions for Stolen Art, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1839, 1841 (1990).
19. Alexander Stille, Was This Statue Stolen?, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 14, 1988, at 32 (quot-
ing James F. Fitzpatrick, a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Arnold & Porter,
who serves as counsel to the American Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and
Primitive Art). Although this statement was made with reference to the antiquities trade,
it seems equally applicable to purchasers of valuable pieces of art, who often have been
confused by the state of the law as to their rights to these pieces.
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tions of the parties, and is consistent with the traditional under-
standing of property ownership.'
With the trade in illegal art reaching overwhelming propor-
tions, a need-some might say an urgency-clearly exists for an
approach like that taken by the Guggenheim court that clarifies
when innocent purchasers may validly assert a statute of limita-
tions defense in a true owner's suit for return of stolen art. This
Note discusses the various approaches that courts have taken to
the statute of limitations defense and determines that the approach
based on the demand rule best satisfies the need for clarity in this
area.
Part I briefly discusses the statute of limitations and its gener-
al function in replevin actions. Part II analyzes developments in
the statute of limitations defense, including a more in-depth view
of the adverse possession defense, the discovery rule and its re-
quirement of due diligence, and the demand rule. Part III focuses
specifically on Guggenheim and the strengths of this significant
decision. It concludes that, despite its perceived drawbacks, the
demand rule upheld in Guggenheim best serves the public interest
because it adheres to traditional property and commercial law
concepts as well as to federal statutory law. This approach also
best communicates what is expected of both innocent purchasers
seeking to prevent true owners from obtaining return of their
stolen artworks and true owners who have delayed either in
searching for a stolen piece or in seeking its return.
I. A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. General Function of the Statute of Limitations
A plaintiff seeking the return of a stolen piece of art has a
cause of action in replevin.2' Replevin demands return of an item
in lieu of damages or criminal prosecution of the possessor.' A
20. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991).
21. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1388 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (applying Indiana law), affd,
917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
22. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990) (defining replevin as "[a]n
action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may re-
cover those goods or chattels"); Leah E. Eisen, Commentary, The Missing Piece: A Dis-
cussion of Theft, Statutes of Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art World, 81 J. CRIM.
L. & CRniNOLOGY 1067, 1072 (1991).
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true owner, however, may not pursue an action in replevin after
the expiration of the statutory limitations period 3 It is this pre-
clusive effect that is of significance in this discussion.
A statute of limitations is intended to prescribe the time dur-
ing which a party may raise a claim in legal proceedings. It is de-
signed to "'stimulate to activity and punish negligence' and pro-
mote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs."24
In Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance Co., ' the U.S. Supreme
Court explained that a statute of limitations is founded on the
notion that
[t]he lapse of years without any attempt to enforce a demand
creates, therefore, a presumption against its original validity, or
that it has ceased to subsist. This presumption is made by these
statutes a positive bar; and they thus become statutes of repose,
protecting parties from the prosecution of stale claims, when, by
loss of evidence from death of some witnesses, and the imperfect
recollection of others, or the destruction of documents, it might
be impossible to establish the truth.26
A statute of limitations is believed to make pursuit of a claim
both more fair and more efficient.27 One author suggests that
fairness to the defendant is indeed the "primary consideration"
underlying the statute of limitations defense because "[t]here
comes a time when [the defendant] ought to be secure in his rea-
sonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient
23. See RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 4.1, at 33 (Walter B.
Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975).
24. Mary K. Devereaux, Note, Battle Over a Monet: The Requirement of Due Dili-
gence in a Lawsuit by the Owner Against a Good Faith Purchaser and Possessor, LOY.
ENT. LJ. 57, 62 (1989) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)); see also
Leake. v. Bullock, 250 A.2d 27, 29 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) ("Statutes of limi-
tation ... are intended to run against those who are neglectful of their rights and who
fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the enforcement thereof.").
25. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1868).
26. Id. at 390; see also Basque v. Yuk Lin Liau, 441 P.2d 636, 637 (Haw. 1968)
(relying on a presumption that people do not voluntarily delay in making genuine
claims).
27. Foutty, supra note 18, at 1842 (suggesting that statutes of limitations condemn
delays in filing a cause of action as an undue burden on the purchaser). Another com-
mentator has suggested that "[a] defendant who does not imagine that any claim may be
brought against him is not only likely to have parted with evidence that he at one time
had but is also likely to have lost track of evidence which at one time he could have
obtained." Jeremy S. Williams, Limitation Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 881, 884 (1973).
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obligations."'  In addition to protecting a defendant, a statute of
limitations is also punitive, depriving a plaintiff of his claim if he
does not act promptly in support thereof2 9
Statutes of limitations serve another important function in
replevin actions. "[Iln the world of commerce and trade, they pro-
vide stability by assuring that those who have dealt in good faith
with property will be made secure in their possession after a cer-
tain period of time. In this way, the statutes reduce uncertainty
and promote free trade of goods."3 The bustling commerce of
today's world would certainly be adversely affected if buyers could
have no assurance that their title to goods was valid.
The length of time statutes of limitations prescribe varies by
.31jurisdiction; more important for the purposes of this discussion
is the point at which the cause of action accrues. Most statutes of
limitations are vague on this point,32 providing only that the limi-
tations period runs for a number of years from the time at which
the cause of action accrues.33 Courts are thereby given broad dis-
28. Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of' Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1185 (1950); see also John G. Petrovich, Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paint-
ings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, UCLA L. REv. 1122, 1127 (1980); Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) ("The theo-
ry is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.").
29. See Eisen, supra note 22, at 1072. The author suggests that this rationale is
based on the notion of a "'sleeping claimant' who intentionally or negligently postpones
bringing an action." Id. at 1072-73. It presumes that a person with a valid claim will not
delay in pursuing the cause of action. Id. at 1073; see also Basque, 441 P.2d at 637 (rely-
ing on the presumption that people do not voluntarily delay in prosecuting authentic
claims).
30. Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1128. This function is worthy of note because the
equitable doctrines applied to a statute of limitations do not always fulfill this goal, and
each court's modification to a statute indicates the emphasis it places on this rationale as
a valid policy goal.
31. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(3) (West Supp. 1993) (three years); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 95.11(i) (West 1982) (four years); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(3)
(McKinney 1990) (three years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09 (Baldwin 1992) (four
years); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (West 1986) (two years).
32. See, e.g., Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277, 285 (N.. 1961) ("Although New
Jersey's Legislature has provided that every action at law for injury to the person shall
be brought within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, it has ...
never sought to define or specify when a cause of action shall be deemed to have ac-
crued . . ").
33. For example, California's introductory statute provides that "[c]ivil actions, with-
out exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after
the cause of action shall have accrued." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 312 (West 1982). This
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cretion to determine whether a cause of action has accrued. This
discretion requires them to ascertain if specific events have oc-
curred.' Rather than focusing on a particular time, a court must
look to the actions and events that constitute the cause of ac-
tion.' In replevin actions, an owner's cause of action typically
accrues at the time his property is stolen, regardless of whether he
knows the identity of the thief or that his property is missing,36
unless the thief or subsequent possessor actively conceals the prop-
erty, preventing open and notorious possession.37
Courts have long recognized that a wrongful taking does not
deprive the owner of the right to possess the property. However,
provision is followed by a string of statutes prescribing the number of years afforded a
plaintiff to assert certain types of claims.
34. "A cause of action comes into existence and thereby accrues when all the ele-
ments necessary to establish... liability occur." William G. Crimmins, Comment, The
Evolution of Illinois Tort Statutes of Limitation: Where Are We Going and Why?, 53
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 673, 677 (1977) (emphasis in original).
35. Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1128-29. The cause of action is specifically said to
accrue when the last of the prerequisites for that cause of action occurs. Id.
36. In fact, this is generally the case when the victim pursues an action against the
thief. See supra text accompanying note 3.
37. Courts are generally in agreement that the statute of limitations is tolled during
a period of wrongful or intentional concealment of stolen property. See, e.g., Jackson v.
American Credit Bureau, Inc., 531 P.2d 932, 936 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Joseph v.
Lesnevich, 153 A.2d 349, 357 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); Reynolds v. Bagwell, 198
P.2d 215, 217 (Okla. 1948). The suspension of the limitations period continues until the
property is held in open and notorious possession. Courts generally place a subsequent
possessor with notice of the theft in the same position as the thief himself, and any
concealment by either will suspend the statute. See Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1131-32
n.36.
Concealment must result from the possessor's affirmative act; failure to publicize
possession is not sufficient. Reynolds, 198 P.2d at 217 (citing United States v. One
Stradivarius Kieserwetter Violin, 197 F. 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1912)). This presents a curious
situation in the case of stolen artwork because possession of art is normally inconspicu-
ous. Pieces of art are often kept in private collections. See infra note 59. In many cases,
fraudulent concealment is not substantially different from good-faith possession. See
Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1131-32 n.36. This curiosity may account for courts' willing-
ness to abandon the mechanical application of the statute of limitations in actions for
recovery of stolen artwork; open and notorious possession may be virtually impossible to
establish. To highlight this point, one court observed that
if jewelry is stolen from a municipality in one county in New Jersey, it is un-
likely that the owner would learn that someone is openly wearing that jewelry
in another county or even in the same municipality. Open and visible posses-
sion of personal property ... may not be sufficient to put the original owner
on actual or constructive notice of the identity of the possessor. The problem is
even more acute with works of art.
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 871. (NJ. 1980). For a more detailed discussion of
this topic, see Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1131-32 n.36.
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because the statute of limitations operates to bar an owner's action
to recover the property, application of this principle can create a
"right without a remedy., 38 Recognition of this futile right has
propelled the courts to consider the desirability of sacrificing me-
chanical application of the statute of limitations in favor of equita-
ble tolling doctrines. Although the courts could make determina-
tions of applicability on a case-by-case basis, they prefer to modify
statutes of limitations through "manipulation of the definition of
the 'accrual' of a cause of action., 39 The resulting doctrines re-
flect judicial interest in the development of a more policy-directed
application of the statute of limitations.
B. Statutes of Limitations Applied to Thieves
In actions for recovery of personal property, the original in-
tent behind the statute of limitations was to allow a suitable peri-
od in which the owner could claim his stolen property from the
thief. During this time, the thief had the opportunity to establish
adverse possession. In the event the owner failed to assert his
claim, the thief's possession ripened into valid title. The owner was
thereby punished for his failure to press the claim; in a sense, the
owner's delay, rather than the running of the statute, vested title
in the thief.
To receive this benefit, the thief not only had to take posses-
sion of the property but also had to prove that the possession was
hostile to the owner, for example, by refusing the owner's demand
for return of the property. In addition, the thief's possession was
required to be open and notorious.' The need for open and no-
' torious possession led to the creation of the exception for fraudu-
lent concealment: a thief is not allowed to conceal the where-
abouts of the property and later claim the statute of limitations as
a defense.4' This exception underscores the importance of adverse
38. Kathleen F. Brickey, The Jurisprudence of Larceny: An Historical Inquiry &
Interest Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1101, 1113 n.75 (1980).
39. Eisen, supra note 22, at 1074.
40. BROwN, supra note 23, § 4.2. Secret possession is often presumed when the thief
is holding property. Id. (citing Lightfoot v. Davis, 91 N.E. 582 (N.Y. 1910); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Connolly, 235 N.W. 634 (Minn. 1931)).
41. Adams v. Coon, 129 P. 851, 852 (Okla. 1913) (citing Gatlin v. Vaut, 91 S.W. 38,
39 (Indian Terr. 1905)) (holding that if the thief had held the property openly and noto-
riously in the area from which the property was stolen, he could have pled the statute of
limitations, but if he concealed the property, the running of the statute would be sus-
1993]
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possession to the operation of the statute as to thieves. Unlike the
case of the innocent purchaser, in which determining that the true
owner lost possession by theft is vital, the inquiry in cases involv-
ing thieves centers on whether the thief has maintained open and
notorious possession.42
In applying this law, courts have split in determining whether
the operation of the statute strips the true owner of title or merely
prevents an action against the thief. In Garrett v. Vaughan,43 the
Supreme Court of Tennessee indicated that the running of the
statute in conjunction with the operation of adverse possession
transferred title, but the running of the statute alone did not. 4
Other cases suggest that the statute itself operates to transfer to
the thief title paramount to that of the true owner.45 The differ-
ence concerns only the status of the title to the property; in both
cases, the thief retains possession. An innocent purchaser, however,
is in a different position than a thief, and this difference in status
has prompted courts to attempt to modify the statute of limitations
in actions to recover stolen artwork from innocent purchasers. The
appropriate modification is the subject of much confusion.
pended until the property was returned to the area and openly held, so that the owner
might have a reasonable opportunity to discover its whereabouts).
42. Garrett v. Vaughan, 60 Tenn. 113, 119-20 (1873); see also Chilton v. Carpenter,
189 P. 747, 749 (Okla. 1920) (quoting Gatlin, 91 S.W. at 39) (requiring possession in an
open and notorious manner for the statute to accrue to the benefit of the thief); Torrey
v. Campbell, 175 P. 524, 525 (Okla. 1918) (requiring that the thief hold the property
openly and notoriously in order to start the statute running).
43. 60 Tenn. 113 (1873).
44. The court highlighted its conclusion by saying that
the statutes which vest the title upon an adverse possession of property, rest
upon a different footing from those statutes of limitation which merely bar a
debt. The first operates on the right, the second on the remedy . ... [T]he
statute acts upon the title, and when the bar is perfect, transfers the property
to the adverse possessor, while in contracts for the payment of money there is
no such thing as adverse possession, but the statute simply affects the remedy
and not the debt.
Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 653 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that the
running of the statute transfers valid title), affd, 612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1979); Lightfoot
v. Davis, 91 N.E. 582, 583 (N.Y. 1910) (same).
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR ACTIONS
TO RECOVER STOLEN ARTWORK
In many countries, the point at which a purchaser gains right-
ful possession of art is easily ascertainable." For instance, in Ja-
pan, the law provides a two-year statute of limitations on recovery
of stolen art from persons who can "plausibly claim" that they
were unaware that the art was stolen when they purchased it. 7
This leniency has made Japan a frequent destination for stolen
art. Some European countries, including Great Britain, recog-
nize the doctrine of market overt, which allows a bona fide pur-
chaser to acquire valid title from a thief if the sale takes place in
an open market.49 Swiss law operates with the presumption that a
purchaser acts in good faith and therefore can acquire good ti-
tle.50
In the United States, however, the courts have not reached a
uniform conclusion on this issue. Instead, they have fashioned at
least three approaches, each imposing varying burdens on the own-
ers of stolen artwork. The differences among these approaches and
the inconsistency with which they have been utilized leave art
collectors wondering if anyone can truly assure them that they
have gained rightful possession of a priceless piece of art. Thus,
the courts must settle on a certain and precise approach. Only
recently has such an approach begun to emerge from the alterna-
tives.
A. The Traditional Notion of Adverse Possession
The oldest approach to determining the availability of the
statute of limitations defense in an owner's replevin action derived
from the concept of adverse possession. In Reynolds v. Bagwell,1
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled that "[t]he statute of limi-
46. The international treatment of stolen artwork, although an interesting topic, is
not within the scope of this Note. These examples are provided by way of contrast to
the various doctrines applied in the United States.
47. Hughes, supra note 13, at 54.
48. Id. at 54-55.
49. JESSE DUKEM'IER & JAMs E. KRLER, PROPERTY 129 (2d ed. 1988).
50. Deborah Hoover, Museum Collections at Risk- Standards of Diligence for Pro-
tecting Your Monet, 20 J. ARTS MGMT. & L., Spring 1990, at 47.
51. 198 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1948).
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tations as to personal property, though stolen, when held in good
faith for value, openly and notoriously, runs in favor of such ad-
verse possession so as to bar a recovery by the true owner after
the expiration [of the statutory period]."' 2 The operation of ad-
verse possession helps preclude the assertion of stale claims. 3
This straightforward application of adverse possession has sev-
eral positive features. First, it focuses on the behavior of the per-
son in possession of the stolen property and the nature of his pos-
session.' Second, the statutory period does not begin to run until
the subsequent possessor meets his burden of proof on the ele-
ments of adverse possession:' (1) actual; (2) open and notorious;
(3) exclusive; (4) continuous; and (5) hostile possession claimed by
the party in possession as a matter of right. 6 Caselaw suggests
that the proof must be at least "clear and positive."5"
The doctrine of adverse possession typically favors the true
owner because the possessor bears the burden of proof as to these
elements. In the context of stolen art, however, the doctrine cre-
ates an almost impossible burden: either the true owner must
locate the stolen property or the subsequent possessor must some-
how meet the vague requirement of "open and notorious posses-
sion,"" a requirement intended to put the true owner on notice
that his property is in the possession of another party. As the
Supreme Court of New Jersey noted in O'Keeffe-v. Snyder, open
52. Id. at 216 (quoting Shelby v. Shaner, 115 P. 785 (Okla. 1911)); see BROWN, su-
pra note 23, § 4.1.
53. Charles D. Webb, Note, Whose Art Is It Anyway? Title Disputes and Resolutions
in Art Theft Cases, 79 KY. LJ. 883, 886 (1990-1991).
54. Eisen, supra note 22, at 1076.
55. See, e.g., Rabinof v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 830, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In
Rabinof, the 'district court refused to transfer the true owner's title to a violin to the
subsequent possessor because he was unable to prove that his possession was hostile to
the rights of the true owner. Id. at 843; see also San Francisco Credit Clearing House v.
Wells, 239 P. 319, 321 (Cal. 1925) (finding that possession lacked continuity and open-
ness, thereby precluding operation of adverse possession).
56. See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPER-
TY § 1012(2) (1968); Thomas, W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse
Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1122, 1123 (1984-1985).
57. See Rabinof, 329 F. Supp. at 841-42 (noting that Illinois law requires "clear, posi-
tive and unequivocal" proof); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 405 A.2d 840, 844 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979) (stating that a defendant must provide proof of a "clear and positive
nature" to establish adverse title), rev'd on other grounds, 416 A.2d 862 (NJ. 1980).
58. Locating stolen art is particularly troublesome; because art is so easily concealed
and generally mobile, there often are significant questions as to whether possession has
been open and notorious. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 871.
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and notorious use of certain types of personal property may be
insufficient to serve this purpose. 9 Moreover, this requirement
has the effect of encouraging art theft and making a claim for
replevin more difficult to pursue.'
B. Application of the Discovery Rule in Replevin Actions
A newer approach modifies the statute of limitations by ap-
plying the discovery rule, imported from medical malpractice cases,
to a replevin action for recovery of stolen artwork, radically redis-
tributing the burdens imposed on the respective parties and estab-
lishing a due diligence requirement. The New Jersey Supreme
Court introduced this approach in O'Keeffe v. Snyder.61
The discovery rule originated in medical malpractice cases.62
In Fernandi v. Strully,6 a surgeon failed to remove a wing nut
from a patient's abdomen during surgery, and the plaintiff did not
discover the error for three years. The court held that "fairness
and justice" dictated that the statute should not have begun to run
until the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the presence of
the wing nut in her body.'
Widespread acceptance of the discovery rule has prompted its
application in a variety of contexts unrelated to medical malprac-
59. Id at 871-72. Historically, this criterion was satisfied "if the property was used
as an average owner of similar property would use it," Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1144,
but traditional use of a stolen painting would not likely give notice to the true owner of
the subsequent possessor's identity. Id.
In approaching this problem, the courts either had to abandon the traditional ratio-
nale of the requirement in favor of a formalistic application or require more than aver-
age use. The latter option burdens the subsequent possessor, who is then forced to go to
great lengths to enjoy the property that he believes to be his own. In O'Keeffe, the court
held that residential display of paintings was not sufficient to meet the statutory require-
ment, implying that only museum-type display would be sufficient. O'Keeffe, 405 A.2d at
847 ("Display in one's home provides to the true owner no more notice of the
possessor's claim ... than would its retention in a closet."). In fact, this stringent re-
quirement of open possession may render adverse possession unworkable in replevin
actions for recovery of stolen art.
60. See generally Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1147-48 (suggesting that the O'Keeffe
court's interpretation of the open and notorious requirement could lead to an increase in
the incidence of art theft).
61. 416 A.2d 862 (NJ. 1980).
62. See id. at 869 (citing Lopez v. Swyer, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (NJ. 1973) (stating that
the discovery rule was first announced by the court in Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277
(NJ. 1961), a medical malpractice action)).
63. 173 A.2d 277 (NJ. 1961).
64. Id. at 286.
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tice.6 In art theft cases, application of the rule suggests that the
owner's cause of action will not accrue until the owner knows or
reasonably should know the identity of the possessor.' This use
of the rule deviates somewhat from the traditional application, in
which the action accrues when the plaintiff becomes aware of the
existence of the cause of action, not merely the identity of the
defendant.67 At least one commentator has suggested, however,
that an owner of stolen art who has diligently but futilely searched
for his stolen painting is not qualitatively different from a medical
malpractice patient who does not yet know of his injury, at least
when compared to the traditional concept of the slothful plaintiff
barred by the statute of limitations.68
1. O'Keeffe v. Snyder. The O'Keeffe case centered on the
claim of noted artist Georgia O'Keeffe, who charged that the
defendant, a gallery owner, was in possession of three paintings
she claimed had been stolen in 1946 from a New York art gallery
owned by her husband, Alfred Stieglitz.69 The defendant, Barry
Snyder, claimed that he was a purchaser for value and that he had
title by adverse possession, having purchased the paintings from
Ulrich A. Frank in 1975. From the time of the alleged theft, the
paintings were displayed either in the private home of Frank's
father or in Frank's own home. In 1975, Snyder purchased the
paintings for $35,000. O'Keeffe subsequently became aware of
Snyder's possession of the paintings and commenced legal ac-
tion.7" The trial court granted Snyder summary judgment on the
ground that the six-year statute of limitations barred O'Keeffe's
suit. The appellate court reversed, holding that the defenses of
65. See, eg., New Mkt. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 241 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1968)
(holding that the discovery rule was applicable to a negligently prepared survey discov-
ered eleven years after the initial preparation); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 238
A.2d 169 (NJ. 1968) (holding that the discovery rule was applicable to defective water
meter installed in plaintiff's home).
66. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (NJ. 1980).
67. Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1153 (calling the medical malpractice action the
paradigm case because the plaintiff does not know he has a cause of action until the for-
eign object is found).
68. Id. at 1154.
69. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 865.
70. See Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1144-45.
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adverse possession and the statute of limitations were identical and
that Snyder had not proved adverse possession.7'
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that adverse possession
was not responsive to the needs of the art world72 and applied
the discovery rule to replevin actions for recovery of stolen
artwork. Under the discovery rule, the true owner's cause of ac-
tion would not accrue as long as the owner made all diligent ef-
forts to locate the stolen property. 3 With this ruling, the court
attempted to vitiate the "harsh results" of mechanical application
of the statute.74 By shifting the emphasis of the law to the true
owner, the court hoped to discourage trafficking in stolen art and
avoid leaving true owners frustrated in their efforts to recover
stolen property.7 5 The court held that what was to constitute due
diligence sufficient to toll the statute would be a question of
fact76 to be determined by weighing the equitable claims of -both
parties.7 The court explicitly recognized, however, that true own-
ers faced difficulties in trying to locate stolen art.7'
71. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 864-65.
72. Id. at 872. After discussing the "arcane world of sales of art, where paintings
worth vast sums of money sometimes are bought without inquiry about their prove-
nance," id., the court recommended that the art world create a title registry or some
other means for purchasers to discover the provenance of a painting. It then stated that
"[a]lthough we cannot mandate the initiation of a registration system, we can develop a
rule for the commencement and running of the statute of limitations that is more respon-
sive to the needs of the art world than the doctrine of adverse possession." Id.
73. Id. While not deciding whether O'Keeffe met her burden in this case, the court
did chronicle her efforts to locate the stolen paintings. Both O'Keeffe and her husband
discussed the theft with their contacts in the field, although they never reported the theft
to a law enforcement agency or advertised it in any art periodicals. Apparently the paint-
ings were uninsured, and no request for reimbursement was ever made. O'Keeffe report-
ed the paintings missing to the director of the Art Institute of Chicago but did not re-
quest that any action be taken. She also reported the theft to the Art Dealers Associa-
tion of America registry of stolen paintings in 1972. In 1975, she learned the where-
abouts of the paintings and promptly issued a demand for them. Id. at 866.
74. Devereaux, supra note 24, at 63.
75. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872-73; Earle A. Partington & Yves-Louis Sage, The
American Response to the Recovery of Stolen and Illegally Exported Art: Should the
American Courts Look to the Civil Law?, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 395, 412 (1988).
76. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873.
77. Id. at 872. The O'Keeffe case settled before a final determination on this ques-
tion was ever reached. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 49, at 127.
78. The court said that "there does not appear to be a reasonably available method
for an owner of art to record the ownership or theft of paintings. Similarly, there are no
reasonable means readily available to a purchaser to ascertain the provenance of a paint-
ing." OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 872. But see Hughes, supra note 13, at 54; Dourian, supra
note 11. There are agencies to whom thefts may be reported; owners are not entirely
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The O'Keeffe decision overruled precedent in New Jersey that
had held adverse possession relevant to chattels,79 but it explicitly
retained the notion that the running of the statute of limitations
transferred title.' This feature is an important one because
without it, the possessor would have no effective means of receiv-
ing title once the statute had expired. Title to the property and
the possessor's status would be murky at best.81
2. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. The decision in
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.' was a major victory for proponents of
the discovery rule, as well as a victory (and a relief) for art muse-
ums.' The facts of the case are as byzantine as the artifacts at
issue. ' In 1988, an Indiana art dealer, Peggy Goldberg, purchased
four Byzantine mosaics for just under $1.2 million. The pieces
were originally part of a large mosaic produced in 520 A.D. that
was attached to the apse of the Panagia Kanakaria in a village in
Northern Cyprus. The mosaics are of great historical significance
because they are among the few religious icons that survived the
without means of publicizing thefts.
79. Specifically, the court overruled Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Soc'y, 28
A.2d 189 (NJ. 1942), and Joseph v. Lesnevich, 153 A.2d 349 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959), on this point. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873.
80. The court stated that
[b]y its terms the statute cuts off the remedy, but not the right of title ....
[T]he effect of the expiration of the statute of limitations, albeit on the theory
of adverse possession, has been not only to bar an action for possession, but
also to vest title in the possessor. There is no reason to change that result
although the discovery rule has replaced adverse possession.
Id at 873-74.
81. A full discussion of this problem, ending with the author's conclusion that the
New Jersey court overstated this proposition and ignored the vital function of adverse
possession in title disputes, is contained in Nicholas D. Ward, The Georgia Grind Can
the Common Law Accommodate the Problems of Title in the Art World, Observations on
a Recent Case, 8 J.C. & U.L. 533, 556-61 (1981-1982).
82. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
83. See William H. Honan, Details of Mosaics Purchase Emerge in Indiana Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1989, at C26.
84. A complete treatment of the facts, as well as additional insight into the colorful
personalities and intrigue surrounding this transaction, are set forth in great detail in a
two-part series in The New Yorker. See Dan Hofstadter, Annals of the Antiquities Trade,
The Kanakaria Mosaics Case (pts 1 & 2), THE NEW YORKER, July 13, 1992, at 36, THE
NEW YORKER, July 20, 1992, at 38.
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period of Iconoclasm in the eighth century, during which all reli-
gious art was ordered destroyed.'
When the island of Cyprus gained independence from British
rule in 1960, civil disturbances followed. In July 1974, the Turkish
military invaded Cyprus from the north. Turkey established its
own government for the land it claimed north of the Green Line
(the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), where its troops had
been stopped. The Kanakaria church is in northern Cyprus, but
the military occupiers left it untouched. However, the Greek Cyp-
riots were eventually forced to flee to southern Cyprus, abandon-
ing the church and its religious relics.86 Apparently, between 1976
and 1979, the Kanakaria church was vandalized. In 1979, the Cyp-
riot Department of Antiquities received a report that the mosaics
were missing; the department spent the next nine years attempting
to recover them, alerting Byzantine art authorities and others in
the art community of the theft.' In 1988, the mosaics appeared
on the market.
Goldberg was in Amsterdam on business when she was of-
fered the opportunity to view and purchase the mosaics. Goldberg
was told that the seller, Aydin Dikman, had found the mosaics in
the rubble of an "extinct" Cypriot church and had been granted
authority by Turkish officials to export them. She was allegedly
shown export documents establishing the authority to export the
pieces.' After securing financing, Goldberg purchased the mosa-
ics and returned with them to Indianapolis. 9
In the fall of 1988, Goldberg offered to sell the mosaics to the
Getty Museum. Meanwhile, the Cypriot ambassador had learned
the mosaics were in the United States and had made inquiries in
85. The mosaics originally depicted Jesus as a young boy with his mother, seated on
a throne and surrounded by light. The mosaic was bordered by two archangels. Next to
each archangel was a frieze with the busts of the twelve disciples. In time, the mosaic
deteriorated; by 1960, only Jesus, one angel, and nine disciples remained intact. Goldberg,
717 F. Supp. at 1377-78. The four mosaics Goldberg purchased included the figure of Je-
sus, the archangel, and the busts of James and Matthew. Meredith Van Pelt, Note,
Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc.: A Case for the Use of Civil Remedies in Effecting the Return of Stolen Art, 8 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 441, 443 (1990).
86. Goldberg, 917 F.2d at 280-81.
87. See Van Pelt, supra note 85, at 444.
88. lt. at 444-45.
89. Id. at 445.
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an effort to locate them.' After being contacted by Goldberg's
dealers, Dr. Marion True at the museum called Dr. Vassos
Karageorghis, the director of the Cypriot Department of Antiqui-
ties, who began the process by which Cyprus eventually learned of
the mosaics' location in Indianapolis. After demand for possession
was made and refused, the Republic of Cyprus and the Church of
Cyprus filed suit.91
The court in Goldberg refused to require a claimant to com-
mence suit during a limited period if the plaintiff had no way,
even through the exercise of due diligence, to discover the exis-
tence of the cause of action. 2 However, the district court ruled
that "a plaintiff who seeks protection under the discovery rule has
a duty to use reasonable diligence to locate the stolen items."'93
On review, the appellate court found that the determination of
due diligence is "fact-sensitive and must be decided on a case-by-
case basis"'  and elaborated on what it believed "discovering" the
cause of action to encompass: "[A] plaintiff cannot be said to have
'discovered' his cause of action until he learns enough facts to
form its basis, which must include the fact that the works are
being held by another and who, or at least where, that 'other'
is." 95 Because it was compelled to consider the equities in tolling
the statute, the district court thoroughly examined the diligence of
the Cypriot government in its attempts to locate the paintings,
finally deciding that the government's efforts were sufficient to
satisfy the due diligence requirement. 6
90. Id.
91. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
92. See id.
93. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992) (citation omitted). In fact, the appellate court stated
that the district court judge hearing the case found the true owner's exercise of due
diligence a "necessary precondition" to application of the discovery rule. Goldberg, 917
F.2d at 289. Cyprus was not and could not reasonably have been on notice of the
mosaics' location until 1988, when they surfaced in Indianapolis. Id.
94. Goldberg, 917 F.2d at 289 (quoting Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1389).
95. Id. (citing O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869-70 (NJ. 1980)).
96. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1389. From the time it learned of the theft, the gov-
ernment of Cyprus engaged in a methodical and thorough effort to recover the lost
property. It first contacted the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nization (UNESCO) to seek assistance in recovering the lost mosaics. News of the theft
was spread to several international organizations and officials whom the Cypriot govern-
ment believed could assist in locating the pieces, including the International Council of
354 [Vol. 43:337
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The successful efforts of the Cypriot government could serve
as a model, at least for institutional collectors, of the effort
necessary to meet the due diligence requirement under the discov-
ery rule. On the other hand, it seems unrealistic to expect individ-
uals to have the resources necessary to engage in such a massive
and painstaking search. What might be most appropriate to con-
clude from this application of the discovery rule, then, is that by
its steady search efforts, Cyprus made its mission abundantly clear
to everyone in the art, political, and academic communities-the
government aimed to notify everyone of the theft and let it be
known that it was actively seeking the return of the missing pieces.
The unequivocality of the Cypriot government's attempts to recov-
er the mosaics may have been the most persuasive element in the
court's determination of due diligence.
In Goldberg, the court found it unnecessary to inquire into
the buyer's status as a bona fide purchaser.' However, this anal-
ysis may have overlooked a significant feature of Indiana law and
produced a decision that clouded the rights of the parties more
than is readily apparent. In its decision, the Goldberg court failed
to apply the state requirement that a demand be made for posses-
sion before suit can be filed against an innocent, or bona fide,
purchaser.98 When demand is required, the limitations period for
actions against the innocent purchaser does not begin to run until
there has been a demand for possession and a subsequent refusal
to return the property.99
Museums and Sites and Harvard University's Dumb arton Oaks Institute for Byzantine
Studies. All possible attempts at publicizing the thefts were undertaken, including release
of regular notices to American and international journalists, elected officials, scholars, and
authorities, updating them on the situation. Id. at 1380. Some skeptics have noted, how-
ever, the oddity that Cyprus did not put any detectives on the case and did not notify
Interpol or the customs agents of any nation. Hofstadter, pt. 1, supra note 84, at 51.
After deciding that Cyprus had met its burden of due diligence, the court conclud-
ed that the cause of action did not accrue until 1988, when the church learned the loca-
tion of the mosaics and that therefore the suit was filed within the statutory period.
Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1391.
97. Id. at 1399 n.22 ("Under Indiana law, even a bona fide purchaser cannot acquire
title to or right to possession of stolen property."). Because the court found that the
mosaics were stolen, Goldberg's status as a bona fide purchaser would not have made a
difference in the resolution of the suit.
98. In Wood v. Cohen, 6 Ind. 455 (1855), the Supreme Court of Indiana noted that
a thief would be liable when the goods were converted, but a demand for possession was
necessary to initiate suit against an innocent purchaser. Id. at 456.
99. But see Jones v. Smith, 24 N.E. 368 (Ind. 1890) (stating that there is no require-
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The court's omission is not an esoteric one; it has at least two
consequences. First, under the demand rule, the state affords some
protection to innocent purchasers: they are made aware of any
claim against them and are given the opportunity to surrender
possession of stolen goods before becoming subject to suit. Similar
protection is not given to purchasers who know that a piece is
stolen (i.e., those who are not bona fide purchasers)."° A deter-
mination that status as a bona fide purchaser is irrelevant to the
accrual of the cause of action removes the protection previously
offered to innocent purchasers. Such a purchaser, therefore, can be
subjected to suit despite his ignorance of a controversy. Second,
the due diligence requirement produces converse results depending
on whether a demand is necessary. If no demand is necessary, as
the court found in this case, the true owner's time to file suit is
extended for the period during which it uses diligent efforts to
locate the property. Under these circumstances, the due diligence
requirement acts as an expansionary force. On the other hand, if a
demand is necessary, the due diligence requirement limits the time
the owner has to file suit. Without the requirement of diligence,
the owner is under no obligation to search for the stolen property
but can wait to fortuitously discover its whereabouts before mak-
ing a demand." 1
The discovery rule has now become the majority rule in re-
plevin actions for recovery of stolen art, followed in almost every
.jurisdiction."° New York is a notable exception."
3. Benefits of and Difficulties with the Discovery
Rule. Because the discovery rule involves a case-specific standard,
its application can lead to inconsistent decisions," although its
ment of a demand when the thief has obtained possession by wrongful or fraudulent
means); Parrish v. Thurston, 87 Ind. 437 (1882) (same).
100. See Foutty, supra note 18, at 1854.
101. See Id. at 1857-58.
102. State Bar Committee on Legal Aspects of the Arts, Acquiring Title to Stolen Art,
55 TEx. BAR ., March 1992, at 237, 238.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 131-34.
104. Compare DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding that indi-
vidual owner failed to meet burden), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1056 (1988) with Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind.) (finding that Cypriot nation, as
owner of ancient relics, met burden of diligence), affd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992). Some commentators have suggested that divergent
standards should emerge to distinguish between efforts required of individuals and those
[Vol. 43".337
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purpose is to clarify the obligations of the true owner."' 5
Whether the value of this clarification overcomes the disadvantage
of inconsistent standards is debatable. One author has suggested
that if a due diligence requirement is to be applied uniformly, a
plaintiff should be compared only to a "similarly situated reason-
ably prudent person" and that courts should specifically note the
difference in resources between individual and institutional collec-
tors in applying the rule. 6
Another basis for inconsistency is the lack of a unified ap-
proach to the reporting of stolen art. There is, in fact, no single
way to alert the community of a theft. Because police efforts vary
by jurisdiction, there is no uniform method to evaluate whether
the true owner undertook reasonable investigative effort. Courts
may experience difficulty extrapolating from one case to another
in determining whether an investigation reaches the level of due
diligence. Because of this difficulty, true owners' obligations are
not in fact clarified." Moreover, an owner may overcompensate
for uncertainty by taking any number of potentially unnecessary
and excessive measures. In the end, the inherent uncertainty of
this protection may force the true owner into a choice between
taking steps to fulfill the duty of diligence or forgoing the costly
measures and conceding ownership of the piece. 8
One apparent advantage of the rule, on the other hand, is
that it seems to meet the stated purpose of the statute of limita-
tions-to punish unreasonable delay by a person with a claim to
pursue, thereby protecting the defendant from having to defend
against a stale claim."° This benefit is illusory, however. The
required of institutions. See Sydney M. Drum, DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New York
a Haven for Stolen Art 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 909, 938 (1989) (suggesting inconsistency may
result from applying a uniform standard despite distinctions between individual and insti-
tutional owners).
105. This is of limited benefit because the discovery rule is not uniformly adopted
across the country. Because the owner cannot anticipate in what jurisdiction the painting
may appear or what his obligations might be under that jurisdiction's laws, this matter is
left somewhat unresolved.
106. Drum, supra note 104, at 938. Institutional collectors, generally museums, have
financial resources far greater than those of most private collectors. They also have ac-
cess to trained personnel and contacts in the art world, which allow them to take ad-
vantage of a greater networking effect to alert the art community of a theft. See id. at
939-41.
107. ld. at 941.
108. Eisen, supra note 22, at 1067.
109. See Foutty, supra note 18, at 1860 ("By adopting the due diligence requirement
1993]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
O'Keeffe court made clear that application of the discovery rule
was intended to favor the true owner, announcing that it was
creating a rule "more responsive to the needs of the art
world."' 0 It accomplished this result by allowing the owner to
extend the limitations period through diligent efforts to locate a
stolen painting.
An often-espoused criticism of the application of the discovery
rule in this context is that the court focuses solely on the actions
of the true owner, not on the elements of adverse possession or
on the subsequent possessor's burden. Abandoning any require-
ments for the subsequent possessor's use and possession of the
property gives him no incentive to reveal possession of the proper-
ty in any way. On the contrary, the incentive is to hide the piece
because a public showing might facilitate the owner's location of
the lost piece.' The discovery rule's singular focus on the true
owner makes the purchaser's actions, assuming he is in fact un-
aware that the painting has been stolen, largely irrelevant."'
If, as the O'Keeffe court noted, application of the discovery
rule is intended to import equity into the statute of limitations, 3
the rule fails to consider the equities to the purchaser. In most
cases, the person in possession of the stolen artwork has no
knowledge of the true owner's attempts to locate the missing
piece. Presumably, if the person in possession acquired such
knowledge, it would affect his status as a good faith possessor,
precluding the assumption of title once the statute has run. In the
end, then, whether the subsequent possessor may enjoy rights to
courts send an effective message to owners of stolen art: the right to maintain a recovery
action is circumscribed by the duty to act prudently."). But see Drum, supra note 104, at
937 (suggesting that a "more generous statute of limitations" for owners would be more
in keeping with the traditional balance struck in other types of cases in which the plain-
tiff brings suit after the literal statutory period has run. Given the obstacles plaintiffs face
in art cases, the time limitation should be a broad one).
110. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (NJ. 1980).
111. As one commentator has suggested,
A rule that hinders the ability of original owners to recover stolen art
works provides economic incentive for thieves to steal and for art dealers to
remain silent as to the illicit origins of a stolen work. Such a rule encourages
the appropriation. . . of great works of art, and is, therefore, in direct opposi-
tion to the public interest.
Drum, supra note 104, at 933-34 (citation omitted).
112. For a discussion reaching the opposite conclusion, see Van Pelt, supra note 85, at
460 (concluding that because the rule will encourage an owner to follow all avenues7 to
locate a painting, a buyer will be wary of items in which he is interested).
113. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
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the painting that he believes to be his own depends solely on the
actions of another, anonymous person. Moreover, there is no tem-
poral limitation on the subsequent possessor's liability; he may
remain subject to suit for any number of years after acquisition of
the property.
A notable objection to the application of the discovery rule is
that it conflicts with the common law notion that a bona fide pur-
chaser of personal property that is taken tortiously or wrongfully,
as by trespass or theft, does not acquire title good against the true
owner."4 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) codifies the
common law axiom.11 Following this logic, it seems that between
the true owner and a subsequent bona fide purchaser, the true
owner should be entitled to the goods because the thief had no
title to convey to the subsequent possessor." 6 In the context of
stolen artwork, however, the courts have given this subject only
cursory treatment. In O'Keeffe, for example, the court made no
mention of the effect of the theft of the paintings on the
purchaser's eventual right to gain title." 7 Because the purchaser
has no right to the artwork, it seems anomalous to allow the stat-.
ute of limitations to prevent the true owner from bringing suit
merely because he has failed to take affirmative actions."'
114. South Miss. Fin. Co. v. Mississippi State Tax Comn~n, 605 So. 2d 736, 739 (Miss.
1992) (noting that this rule is "as old as the hills and often enforced without regard to
context, viz., no thief... has power to pass title to his ill-gotten goods") (citations
omitted).
115. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1989) (defining "purchase" as a voluntary transfer creat-
ing an interest in property); id. § 2-403(1) (providing that a purchaser of goods has only
the title his transferor had power to transfer).
116. See, eg., Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259 (App. Div. 1979), affd, 439
N.Y.S.2d 105 (N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted) (stating that "[possession without more is
insufficient to create an estoppel" and holding that the true owner of an Utrillo was
entitled to the return of the painting or damages from its loss from the subsequent pos-
sessor, who obtained the painting from a person not authorized to sell it); Lieber v. Mo-
hawk Arms, Inc., 314 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (holding that owner of Hitler's
personal belongings was entitled to recover the items that the transferor stole from him
and sold to a bona fide purchaser).
117. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873. In Goldberg, the court failed to take notice of this
issue. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
118. See Eisen, supra note 22, at 1100 (arguing that denying the owner his right. to
sue fails to achieve the discovery rule's aim of equity).
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C. The Demand Rule as a Prerequisite for Accrual
Not all courts have been willing to adopt the discovery rule.
Another approach to the determination of accrual is to use the
demand rule, a judicial doctrine reinterpreting the statute of limi-
tations. The rule, which normally applies in actions to recover
chattel, requires that the true owner make a demand for posses-
sion and that the possessor refuse to release the property in order
to start the statute of limitations running.119 A minority of state
courts, most notably New York, takes this approach.12
1. Menzel v. List. In Menzel v. List,' the New York
Court of Appeals considered the question of accrual in a suit to
recover a stolen painting. The plaintiffs sought to recover a
gouache by Marc Chagall that they had been forced to leave hang-
ing in their apartment when they fled the Nazis in 1941. The Nazis
confiscated the painting and left a receipt showing it had been
taken for "safekeeping." The Menzels relocated to the United
States in 1941, and although they searched for the painting, they
were unable to locate it until it was found in the possession of the
defendant, Albert List, in November 1962."2 List claimed he
purchased the painting in good faith from a gallery in New York
in 1955. The whereabouts of the painting from 1941 until 1955
were never established, but the gallery owner from whom List pur-
chased the painting claimed to have bought it from the reputable
Galerie Art Moderne in Paris.123
Both sides agreed that List was an innocent purchaser who
had no knowledge that the painting was stolen when he acquired
it. List claimed that the statute of limitations barred the suit,
based on the running of the statute either from the date the paint-
ing was originally stolen in 1942, or from the time his possession
began in 1955.124 The court denied this defense, however: "In
replevin... the cause of action against a person who lawfully
comes by a chattel arises, not upon the stealing or the taking, but
upon the defendant's refusal to convey the chattel upon de-
119. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991).
120. See id.
121. 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
122. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806-07 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d
608 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
123. Id. at 807-08.
124. Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1134.
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mand."' 5 Even a twenty-year lapse of time between the com-
mencement of proceedings and the defendant's initial possession
did not bar the suit.
In making its decision on the statute of limitations defense,
the court cited earlier decisions in which it had explained that de-
mand and refusal are prerequisites to a cause of action for con-
version. This requirement makes the innocent purchaser aware that
a claim against the property is pending and offers an opportunity
to return the property before being treated as a wrongdoer. Until
the owner makes a demand and the subsequent possessor refuses
to surrender the property, the possession is not considered wrong-
ful.126 The subsequent possessor, having acquired the property by
honest and lawful means, has no reason to suspect a claim until a
demand is made.' This treatment of the innocent purchaser is
consistent in theory with the treatment of a person in possession
of goods that he knows to be stolen, a "wrongful possessor." In
those cases, the courts treat the wrongful possessor as having the
requisite warning that a claim against the property is pending and
therefore dispense with the requirements of demand and refus-
al." Similarly, the innocent purchaser has statutory protection
until he learns that his possession is wrongful through a demand
by the true owner.
2. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon. Further devel-
opment of the demand rule emerged from the decision in
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,29 in which a federal
district court interpreted New York law regarding the recovery of
stolen art. The case involved two Albrecht Duerer paintings exhib-
125. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (citations omitted).
126. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 848-49 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), affd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
127. The Indiana Supreme Court interpreted the demand rule fashioned in its state
courts in the following manner:
This rule is based on the presumption which the law indulges that one who has
lawfully come into possession of property which he is not entitled to retain will,
upon demand, surrender it to the person entitled thereto and that he ought to
be afforded an opportunity so to do without being subjected to the inconve-
nience and expense of a law suit.
Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc., 46 N.E.2d 243, 244 (Ind. 1943) (citations omitted).
128. See Atlas Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 183 A. 690, 692 (Conn. 1936) (noting that demand
is not necessary when the possession is a result of the possessor's wrongful taking,
wrongful use, or wrongful exercise of control over the property).
129. 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
1993]
362 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:337
ited by a German art museum, Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar.
During World War II, the paintings were housed for safekeeping
in a castle, the Schloss Schwarzburg, located in what became East
Germany. They were stolen from the castle in 1945. In 1966, they
were located in the home of Edward Elicofon, where they had
been displayed since he purchased them almost twenty years earli-
er. The case involved myriad international and dynastic law ques-
tions, due largely to the intervention of the Grand Duchess of
Saxony-Weimar, who made a claim to the paintings.13
The district court, in a decision that was affirmed by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, interpreted New York's
law to require a demand and refusal to start the statute of limita-
tions running. The only requirement the court specified was a
demand for possession followed by a refusal to surrender the
property.3  The court declined to impose a requirement of due
130. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1153-55. The Grand Duchess intervened as a plaintiff, argu-
ing that the paintings had been the private property of the successive Grand Dukes of
Saxony-Weimar and that title to the paintings had been passed to her by her husband,
Grand Duke Carl August. The museum, representing the claim of the East German gov-
ernment, asserted that title to the painting passed to East Germany as the successor in
interest to the prior regime's property.
131. New York law provides that when a demand is necessary to commence an ac-
tion, the action accrues at "the time when the right to make the demand is complete."
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 206(a) (McKinney 1990). In Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries, 355
N.Y.S.2d 741, 747 (Civ. Ct. 1974), the court interpreted this section as holding that a
right to demand possession of property is complete when the defendant acquires the
property, regardless of whether the plaintiff knows all the facts. However, the courts have
distinguished between the statute's application as a procedural element and as a substan-
tive element. The statute applies only when the demand is a procedural element in the
cause of action. In Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964), the appellate
court held that "with respect to a bona fide purchaser of personal property a demand by
the rightful owner is a substantive . . . prerequisite to the bringing of an action." This
rule, dubbed the "unreasonable delay" rule, starts the statutory period running when the
plaintiff has had the opportunity to locate the property and make a demand and has
failed to do so. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 107 nA (2d Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); see also, eg., Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1161 (holding section 206
inapplicable in actions seeking recovery from an innocent purchaser).
There has been some attention given to whether the requirement of demand is
indeed a substantive requirement for a replevin action. In Atlas, the defendants, innocent
purchasers of a stolen automobile, claimed the action in replevin was improperly filed
because no demand was made. The court said that although innocent purchasers are
usually entitled to a demand, it is not an element of a replevin case but merely a pro-
tection. Atlas, 183 A. at 693. If the defendant is not seriously injured by its absence,
courts may not require a demand, even in cases involving purchasers of stolen property.
However, this does not seem to be a matter subject to question in New York; moreover,
it is inconsistent with the courts' treatment of wrongful possessors, who are not accorded
the protection of a demand, and against whom the statute begins to run immediately.
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diligence because it found that the true owner had made diligent
efforts." However, the court warned that there was an implicit
requirement that the plaintiff not unreasonably delay in making a
demand once the property was located. Presumably, it recog-
nized this requirement to prevent plaintiffs from making unreason-
able delays in pursuing their claims."M The Second Circuit re-
viewed the museum's efforts to report the theft and to locate the
stolen pieces,135 concluding that the museum had shown the req-
uisite diligence in making the demand. 36 Narrowly interpreting
the decision in Menzel v. List, however, the court reiterated that
due diligence in investigating the .claim was not a requirement
under New York law."3
In Elicofon, the plaintiff argued that without a requirement
that the true owner exercise due diligence in searching for a stolen
piece, the demand rule favors the thief over the bona fide pur-
chaser.1 38 The statute of limitations begins to run against a thief
immediately, but a bona fide purchaser must wait indefinitely for
demand to be made before the statute begins to run.139 The
plaintiff further argued that because under the statute, the bad
faith purchaser is treated identically to the thief, the statute, also
132. Elicofon, 536 F.Supp. at 849-50.
133. Id. at 849 (citing Heide v. Glidden Buick Corp., 67 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (App.
Term 1947)); see also Reid v. Board of Supervisors, 28 N.E. 367, 369 (N.Y. 1891) (pro-
viding that when a plaintiff demands possession of property, the demand must be made
within a reasonable period of time); Heide, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 906 (holding that a true own-
er may not postpone demand indefinitely but must make demand within a reasonable
time).
In DeWeerth, the court clarified that this proscription against unreasonable delay is
not coterminous with laches, although it sounds similar. It refers only to an unexcused
lapse of time, not to injury to the defendant, as laches requires. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at
107.
134. See generally Webb, supra note 53, at 888.
135. Ellcofon, 678 F.2d at 1156. In reviewing the museum's actions, the court noted
that the director had contacted various museums and administrative organizations to re-
port the theft, including the Allied Control Council, the Fogg and Germanic Museums at
Harvard University, the U.S. State Department, and the Soviet Military Administration.
Elicofon's discovery in 1966 that the paintings were authentic Duerers made world news.
Thereafter, the museum demanded possession of the paintings. Id. at 1156.
136. Id. at 1165 (affirming the district court's conclusion that the museum had shown
diligence in making its demand).
137. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608
(App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
138. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1163 (2d Cir. 1982).
139. Id.
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favors a bad faith purchaser over the bona fide purchaser.140 In
response to this argument, the court cited the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals in General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa,4'
which states that the operation of equitable principles prevents
such anomalous favoring of the thief.42 Moreover, the court not-
ed that New York had consistently favored protection of the true
owner's fights and had not allowed the limitations period to run
regardless of the owner's ignorance. 43 This discussion was the
backdrop for the next significant case interpreting New York's de-
mand rule. It came as the first sign from the courts that the per-
ceived lack of balance in the equities might be a source of con-
cern.
3. DeWeerth v. Baldinger. In 1987, in DeWeerth v.
Baldinger,'" the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
applying New York law, modified the demand rule to include a
requirement of due diligence in searching for a stolen painting.45
It thereby squarely focused attention on the equities in replevin
actions for recovery of stolen art.
In 1922, the plaintiff, Gerda DeWeerth, inherited a Monet
painting entitled Champs de B16 d Vgtheuil. The painting hung in
her home between 1922 and 1943. Once the collapse of the Ger-
man Third Reich was imminent, DeWeerth relocated, sending the
painting to her sister in southern Germany for safekeeping. In
1945, shortly after the end of World War II, American soldiers
were stationed in the castle in which DeWeerth's sister lived.
Thereafter, the sister noticed that the painting was missing. 46
140. Id, (citing Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874)).
141. 219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966).
142. In Chiappa, the court held that equitable estoppel prevents the wrongdoer from
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense so he cannot "take refuge behind the
shield of his own wrong." Id. at 170-71. The Elicofon court noted that even if the princi-
ples of equity did not prevent this anomaly, the bona fide purchaser is still treated better
than the thief in that he is not responsible for damages to the property prior to the
demand. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1163 n.24 (citations omitted).
143. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1163-64.
144. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
145. Id. at 109-10. After the New York Court of Appeals decision in Guggenheim,
which effectively overruled the decision in this case, the district court granted relief to
the plaintiff under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), enabling her to retain ownership and posses-
sion of the painting. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). For
a discussion of Guggenheim, see infra Part H.
146. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 104-05.
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After learning of the disappearance, DeWeerth contacted
several authorities to report the loss. In 1946, she filed a report
with the military government managing the northern provinces of
Germany; in 1948, she wrote a letter to an attorney asking if any
steps could be taken to obtain the return of the painting.
DeWeerth also sent a picture of the painting to a renowned art
professor, asking him to investigate the location of the painting.
Finally, in 1957, almost 12 years later, she reported the theft to
the West German Bureau of Investigation in a list of items she
lost during the war. No evidence indicates that any of these efforts
were fruitful, and they were the last significant efforts DeWeerth
undertook to locate the painting.47
The Monet resurfaced in December 1956, when a New York
City art gallery obtained it from Francois Reichenbach, a Swiss art
dealer. The painting was then purchased by Edith Baldinger for
$30,900. Neither party disputed that Baldinger was an innocent
purchaser. With the exception of two public exhibitions in 1957
and 1970, the painting hung in Baldinger's home until one of
DeWeerth's nephews located it. DeWeerth subsequently made a
demand for possession.'"
Baldinger asserted the statute of limitations as a defense, as
well as laches, claimed an unreasonable delay in the commence-
ment of proceedings, and pressed for the adoption of the "due
diligence" rule utilized in other jurisdictions. DeWeerth claimed
there could be no unreasonable delay when she could not ascer-
tain the identity of the present possessor and could not know
against whom the claim was to be made.'49
The district court ruled that the demand rule required no
more than that DeWeerth file suit within three years of the de-
mand and refusal. Under this standard, the delay in bringing suit
was reasonable, and the suit was timely filed.' The Second Cir-
cuit, however, ruled that in addition to the obligation to make a
demand without delay once the person in possession of the prop-
erty is identified, the true owner has an obligation to undertake
diligent efforts to locate the stolen property to make a demand in
147. Id. at 105.
148. Id. at 105-06.
149. Devereaux, supra note 24, at 60.
150. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 694 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
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a timely manner. The court found DeWeerth's minimal investiga-
tion insufficient to constitute such an effort.151 In doing so, the
court compared DeWeerth's individual efforts to the museum's
efforts in Elicofon;'52 although the court purported to decide the
case on equitable standards, 53 it gave no more than a glancing
concern to any inequity in that comparison.
The DeWeerth court found that the inquiry into diligence
necessarily had to focus on DeWeerth's efforts, rather than
Baldinger's actions," in order to accord with what the court
called New York's policy of protecting innocent purchasers. 55 It
pointed out that without a due diligence requirement, a good faith
purchaser could be exposed to suit long after a thief or wrongful
possessor would have achieved repose. Yet, as others have ob-
served, the court's assertion all but ignores the rule in Menzel v.
List that an innocent purchaser suffers no legal exposure until he
has been made aware of a pending claim.'5 6 The statutory period
is no longer for the innocent purchaser than the thief because in
the eyes of the law, the possession is not wrongful until demand is
made, and it is only on demand that the statutory period begins to
run.
157
151. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111-12.
152. The court reviewed Deweerth's efforts, comparing her investigation to that of
the museum in Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), affd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982), see supra note 135, and found DeWeerth's
failure to contact several agencies established for the purpose of locating stolen art par-
ticularly notable. For example, DeWeerth failed to notify the U.S. State Department,
which was actively engaged in locating stolen art, and the allied forces' program in Eu-
rope, which was established for the same purpose and through which her family had
recovered other stolen pieces. Also, DeWeerth neglected to contact museums and galler-
ies whose vigilance might have been helpful. Finally, the court said that DeWeerth's
failure to search for 27 years, between 1957 and 1981, was a significant omission, because
during that time there were several references to the painting in publications. Indeed, it
was a listing in the Catalogue Raisonn6 through which she eventually located the paint-
ing. DeWeerth was a sophisticated art collector, the court said, and she could have hired
someone to conduct an investigation even if she were unable, because of her age, to
conduct the search herself. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111-12.
153. This comparison is in stark contrast to the district court's assessment of
DeWeerth's efforts as reasonable. The district court found her endeavors "fruitless" but
credited her for her effort. In addition, the district court noted that she was, at this
point, an elderly woman, lacking the resources and contacts that an institution would
have. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694-95.
154. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109.
155. Id. at 108.
156. See Drum, supra note 104, at 931.
157. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d
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The court found that- applying a due diligence rule to stolen
art was particularly appropriate because art is generally housed in
private collections, making it likely that an owner looking for a
piece would learn of its location only through investigation. The
due diligence requirement, the court said, gives the owner incen-
tive to search for his property by barring a later claim of owner-
ship if he does not.' The court noted that a further advantage
of the rule is that because art loses value when damaged or al-
tered, a true owner recovering the property is more likely than
other victims to find his property in its original condition, thus
making the true owner's diligence more worthwhile. 9 However,
these observations overlook the fact that much of the art that is
recovered is located only after a fortuitous chain of events leads to
the identification of the present location of the piece. A recovery
rate of around ten percent indicates that recovery is not the com-
mon result of diligent efforts."6 In essence, the requirement of
diligence may serve as an economic incentive for thieves. By de-
manding that a true owner undertake a diligent search and incur a
panoply of financial, emotional, and logistical strains, this rule
effectively hinders the true owner in attempting to recover stolen
pieces and makes the thief's continued possession more likely.'
The court stated that the purpose of statutes of limitations
was to promote "fairness to a defendant."'62 The imposition of
the' due diligence requirement, it said, is appropriate in art theft
cases because of the long delays in locating stolen artwork. With-
out such a requirement, no legal obligation to pursue a claim
arises, and the goal of fairness would be thwarted by making inno-
cent purchasers and their heirs subject to suit for centuries. True
owners would be free to unreasonably delay actions until the loca-
tion of the property was fortuitously discovered, and fraudulent
608 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
158. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109-110 (citing O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (NJ.
1980)).
159. See id. at 109.
160. See Drum, supra note 104, at 933 (discussing further how art dealers' lack of
diligence in authenticating the provenance of artwork contributes to the problem of inter-
national art theft).
161. Id. at 933-34.
162. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109 (citing Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 248
N.E.2d 871 (N.Y. 1969)).
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claims would be encouraged to the extent that memories had
faded and evidence had been lost. 3
However, this view fails to recognize the protection that New
York's Menzel rule affords owners. Like other modifications to the
mechanical operation of the statute of limitations period, the de-
mand rule is intended to give plaintiffs the benefit of time. In
stolen art cases, the rule represents an implicit judicial recognition
of the difficulties true owners face in locating stolen art and a
policy choice favoring the true owner over the innocent purchaser.
This idea is consistent with traditional notions of equity because if
the statute began to run against the true owner at the time of the
theft, without allowing the owner time to locate the artwork, the
owner would be left without a remedy once the statutory period
ended.
By contrast, even if a true owner wins a suit for replevin, an
innocent purchaser may still seek a remedy from the person from
whom he purchased the work. For example, he might institute a
suit against his seller for breach of warranty."6 In addition, al-
though the innocent purchaser may lose the defense of the statute
of limitations by operation of the demand rule, he is free to assert
a claim of laches. The availability of laches as a defense is impor-
tant; it answers the court's concern that innocent purchasers may
be subject to suit years, or even centuries, after acquisition of
property because no legal obligation to pursue the claim has aris-
en. Such a delay would certainly injure purchasers who could not
defend against replevin suits because of lost evidence and faded
memories without incurring higher costs than would have been in-
curred if owners were required to make a prompt demand."
In rendering its decision, the DeWeerth court squarely faced
the demand rule's anomalous difference in treatment between
thieves and innocent purchasers. The court reasoned that without a
requirement of due diligence, the thief was in a more enviable
position than the innocent purchaser because as long as no de-
mand was made against the purchaser, the statutory period did not
accrue, and the purchaser remained subject to suit. The court's
requirement of diligence helped mitigate the inequity of favoring
163. See id.
164. See Drum supra note 104, at 938.
165. Id. at 942-43.
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the thief over the innocent purchaser and created an incentive for
the plaintiff to search for the painting.' 66
The Second Circuit refused to certify the question to the New
York Court of Appeals on the ground that the problem was not
likely to recur with sufficient frequency to require a determination
by that court. As the New York Court of Appeals observed in a
later case, however, the courts do face this question with surprising
frequency.' 67
III. SOLOMON R. GUGGENHEIM FOUNDATION V. LUBELL
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Following the DeWeerth case, the due diligence standard, in
conjunction with the demand rule, seemed firmly entrenched. In its
1991 decision in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v.
Lubell, 68 however, the New York Court of Appeals retrenched
and returned the. law of New York to the demand and refusal
standard, abandoning the due diligence requirement the Second
Circuit had imposed in DeWeerth.
A. The Decision in Guggenheim
As in earlier cases, the Guggenheim decision involved a stolen
painting and the question of when the rights of the true owner to
sue for return of the painting were lost by the passage of time.
The case involved a gouache by Marc Chagall, Menageries or Le
Marchand de Bestiaux, valued at around $200,000. The
Guggenheim Museum sued the defendants for return of the paint-
ing after discovering its whereabouts in 1986, over ten years after
the museum had written off the painting as lost. The museum
discovered the painting was misplaced some time in the 1960s but
did not admit that it was missing until a comprehensive inventory
in 1970. Having discovered the loss, the Guggenheim failed to
notify any other museums, the police, Interpol, or any artistic
organizations. The museum claimed that it made a tactical decision
not to publicize the loss for fear of driving the painting under-
ground and decreasing the chances of recovery. The Lubells pur-
166. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109; Robert A. Barker, Rights Involving Stolen Art,
N.Y. LU., March 25, 1991, at 3.
167. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429-30 (N.Y. 1991).
168. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
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chased the painting from a gallery in 1967 and exhibited it twice:
once in 1967 and again in 1981. A former employee of the
Guggenheim who knew the painting was missing recognized a
transparency of the painting and alerted the museum, which traced
possession to the Lubells.6 9
The Lubells defended on the basis of the museum's lack of
diligence in searching for the painting. In fact, the museum under-
took few, if any, of the efforts the courts demanded of previous
plaintiffs;170 particularly noteworthy was the museum's failure to
contact law enforcement authorities.17 ' The trial court found the
museum's behavior unreasonable as a matter of law, but the ap-
pellate court found otherwise. It reviewed the decision in
DeWeerth and the rules of accrual under New York law, reiterat-
ing that the requirement of a demand to an innocent purchaser,
"or indeed anyone else whose possession is not tortious," is a sub-
stantive element of the cause of action and concluding that "ab-
sent a demand there is no cause of action for replevin against a
good-faith purchaser, and absent a cause of action the statute
cannot begin to run.""
The DeWeerth court had attempted to mitigate the unreason-
able delay doctrine, the appellate court said, by extending it to
situations in which knowledge could be imputed to the true owner
through a standard of due diligence; in the past, the rule had
extended only to situations in which the true owner had actual
knowledge of the whereabouts of a piece. The DeWeerth court's
rule extended the inquiry past the traditional question of whether
the suit was filed in a timely manner after the demand. 73 The
Guggenheim court said that the doctrine developed in DeWeerth
was far from what it promised and explicitly rejected the Second
Circuit's imposition of a duty of due diligence on owners of stolen
169. Id. at 428.
170. Moreover, the defendant, Mrs. Jules Lubell, suggested that at the least, the mu-
seum could have hired private investigators or notified the artist or his cataloguer, both
of whom she contacted before purchasing the painting. Barbara Franklin, Suit Reinstated
over Chagall Work, N.Y. L.., Jan. 26, 1990, at 1.
171. This failure is significant since the court reacted so negatively to the plaintiff's
similar failure in the DeWeerth case, in which the court found the plaintiff's diligence in-
sufficient to toll the statute. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 111-12 (2d. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
172. Solomon L Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (App. Div.
1990) (emphasis added), affd, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
173. Id. at 620-21.
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art for purposes of accrual.'74 There is no reason, the court said,
to "obscure [the demand rule's] straightforward protection of true
owners by creating a duty of reasonable diligence."' 75 According
to the court, imposition of a diligence standard did not eradicate
the potential for stale claims; moreover, the DeWeerth court never
specified the particular point at which the cause of action actually
accrued.'76 Finally, because New York treats demand as a sub-
stantive element of the cause of action, no proceeding may be in-
stituted without it.17
The Guggenheim court viewed DeWeerth as a decision based
on estoppel: "Although the plaintiff's title to the stolen property
might be lawful, she should not be heard to assert it because the
delay attributable 'to her lack of diligence in searching for the
property prejudiced the defendant in her defense."'78 The court
found that the proper standard in cases of unusual delay is laches,
which requires injury to the defendant in addition to delay.179 In
making laches the applicable defense, the court wisely distributed
to the innocent purchaser a portion of the burden of proof that
the due diligence requirement had shifted wholly to the true own-
er. The requirement that injury be proven mandates that an inno-
cent purchaser present proof that he acted reasonably in purchas-
ing the painting and that he had no notice of the possibility of a
claim against the painting when he purchased it." This require-
ment also shifts to the subsequent possessor part of the burden of
174. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d. at 430.
175. Id.
176. See Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 621. The New York court noted that in
DeWeerth, the court stated in a footnote that the limitations period conceptually begins
to run when the plaintiff has had the opportunity to use due diligence in both locating
the property and making a demand and has failed to do so. Id. (citing DeWeerth v.
Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 107 nA (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988)).
177. This reflects the New York view that until there is a demand and refusal, the
subsequent possession is not wrongful. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429. In actions in
which a demand is a procedural element of the cause of action, New York's three-year
statute of limitations runs from the time the right to make demand is complete, N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. L & R. § 214(3) (McKinney 1990), typically from the time of the theft. In
this case, there can be no cause of action without it; the statute is inapplicable when no
demand has been made.
178. Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
179. Id. at 619.
180. The court stated that in this defense, the "defendant's vigilance is as much in
issue as plaintiff's diligence." Id. at 623.
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investigation. It is an explicit recognition that injury, as well as
delay, is required to divest the true owner of title.81
Moreover, the lower court questioned whether delay alone
could make a replevin action untimely even when the owner had
actual knowledge of the whereabouts of the stolen property."t
The court declared a policy stance favoring the rightful owner with
its pronouncement that "the relative possessory rights of the par-
ties cannot depend upon the mere lapse of time, no matter how
long. '' s" The Court of Appeals of New York was just as em-
phatic when it said that "New York case law has long protected
the right of the owner whose property has been stolen to recover
that property, even if it is in the possession of a good faith pur-
chaser for value."'' "
Finally, the facts of the Guggenheim case suggest the over-
whelming difficulty in fashioning a standard of diligence. Because
even members of the art world have not reached a consensus on
the best way to approach a theft, e.g., whether to publicize .the
theft or to conduct an internal investigation, the Court of Appeals
held that it was "particularly inappropriate" for it to spell out
arbitrary rules for diligent conduct." In addition, because a
number -of factors would (properly) influence how a true owner
searches for stolen property, the law could not determine how best
to proceed. 6 The demand rule offers a more reliable approach.
181. See also Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (requiring proof of injury in order for a subsequent purchaser to dispute
the true owner's title).
182. Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 621. The court cites some authority to the contrary
but continues to refer to lack of diligence as an element of laches. This notion of timeli-
ness is consistent with the New York courts' view that possession is not wrongful until a
demand is made. If the innocent purchaser is not in wrongful possession, it is illogical to
suppose that a limitations period could be running; no cause of action exists to which the
statutory period can apply.
183. Id. at 622. The court expressed the feeling that in some sense, the delay had
provided a benefit to the defendant by allowing her many years in possession of the
painting during which she could enjoy its exhibition in her home, a benefit she would
not ordinarily have experienced. Id.
184. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991) (ci-
tation omitted).
185. Id. at 431.
186. Id. These factors include the value of the property stolen, the manner in which it
was stolen, and the type of institution from which it was stolen. The last factor is of
particular interest given the tendency of prior court holdings to largely ignore the dispari-
ties in resources available to individual and institutional collectors.
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B. Guggenheim as Precedent for Recent Cases
Several courts have followed the Guggenheim court's inter-
pretation of the law in recent decisions. In Republic of Turkey v.
Metropolitan Museum of Art,"s a federal district court in New
York applied the Guggenheim analysis to a motion for summary
judgment on Turkey's claims for recovery of cultural artifacts that
the museum held. The court determined that the claim of delay
made by the party in possession was valid only for purposes of
examining the availability of the laches defense."
The defendant, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, attempted
to distinguish Guggenheim. It claimed that the Guggenheim court
disagreed with DeWeerth only to the extent that DeWeerth extend-
ed the unreasonable delay rule to a case in which the true owner
had no actual knowledge of the location of the stolen property but
in which he could have had knowledge had he exercised due dili-
gence in investigating the whereabouts of the property. The muse-
um attempted to distinguish between the due diligence rule as
applied to cases in which the true owner had actual knowledge of
all the facts needed to make a demand and as applied to cases in
which such knowledge was imputed. The court did not accept this
distinction and denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.189
The recent case of Hoelzer v. City of Stamford"9 also ap-
plied the Guggenheim analysis. Although the case did not deal
with stolen art, it did address the issues of the rightful possession
of art and whether a plaintiff's unreasonable delay in making a
demand for property causes the statute of limitations to run. 19'
187. 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
188. Id. at 46-47.
189. Id. at 47.
190. 933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991).
191. The facts of this case are as complex as those of cases involving stolen art. The
plaintiff was an art restorer to whom six murals were delivered in 1971. The murals were
a Works Progress Administration project that had hung in a local high school for several
years before being removed during reconstruction and inadvertently tossed out as trash.
Hoelzer supposedly agreed to restore the murals on behalf of the federal government
and return them on request. Id. at 1133-34.
School district officials did not know the location of the murals until 1980. At that
time, a school official visited Hoelzer to inquire about the murals. Although Hoelzer
claimed to the contrary, the district court found that he had not asserted ownership at
the meeting. In 1986, fifteen years after he originally received the murals, Hoelzer
claimed ownership. City and school officials disputed Hoelzer's claim, and in 1989, he
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Although the district court's decision focused largely on the issue
of unreasonable delay, the appellate court, referring to
Guggenheim, found that unreasonable delay was an inappropriate
consideration in the statute of limitations context."9 A due dili-
gence requirement did not affect the running of the statute be-
cause "an owner need not act with due diligence before demand-
ing return of her property."193 Instead, the statute begins to run
when the owner makes a demand for possession and the possessor
refuses, "regardless of the apparent intensity of the owner's search
up until that point."'" Moreover, the district court made an in-
teresting observation: when the present possessor was not a good-
faith purchaser (in this case he was entrusted with'the murals for
restorative services), the possessor would receive a windfall if he
were allowed to keep the murals because he neither paid any
consideration for them nor had any reasonable expectations in
relation to them, save the value of his services performed on
them.195
C. Analysis of the Demand Rule
The demand rule followed by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Guggenheim is the soundest policy yet applied in stolen
art cases. This doctrine best balances the respective rights of the
parties and delegates most equitably the obligations of both inno-
cent purchasers and true owners. This Section examines the as-
pects of the demand rule that make it preferable to other ap-
proaches used by the courts in stolen art cases: its coherence with
common law and federal law doctrines; its consistency with the
political climate; its potential for clarity and certainty; its inhibitory
effect on the burgeoning trade in stolen artwork; and its equitable
and effective shifting of the requisite duties of inquiry and investi-
gation to both parties.
fied suit to quiet title. Id. at 1134-35.
192. Id. at 1136-37.
193. Id. at 1137.
194. Id. at 1138; see also Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land Co. of Am., 931
F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1991) (reiterating that the three-year statute of limitations does not
begin to run until there is a demand for possession and a refusal and that no duty of
due diligence is imposed on the owner of stolen property when recovery is sought from
an innocent purchaser).
195. Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 722 F. Supp. 1106, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 933
F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991).
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The demand rule is often criticized for reducing "the repose
of innocent purchasers to a nullity" by tolling the statute of limita-
tions period until an aggrieved owner has made a demand and
allowing aggrieved owners to pursue a cause of action regardless
of the passage of time.1" However, the Guggenheim court effec-
tively answered this criticism. By emphasizing the availability of
the doctrine of laches, the court imposed a burden of investigation
on the purchasers of stolen art to determine the authenticity and
provenance of the works they contemplate purchasing. If a pur-
chaser meets this burden, he will have genuine repose, unlike the
uncertain repose the discovery rule creates by making the
purchaser's status with regard to title entirely dependent on the
actions of the true owner. The additional requirement of injury to
the purchaser is not an unreasonable one; if the delay in institut-
ing the action does not injure the purchaser, why should the true
owner not be restored to possession? Moreover, the innocent
purchaser needs no protection against this "harsh" rule through
application of a due diligence requirement because other causes of
action are available to him, namely breach of implied warranty of
title." The availability of remedies for an innocent purchaser
militates against affording him any absolute protection. Instead, the
Menzel/Guggenheim rule provides protection for original owners,
as well as defenses for innocent purchasers, through the applica-
tion of laches and the availability of other causes of action. 9
One of the demand rule's most promising attributes is its
consistency with the common law rule, now codified in the UCC,
that even a good-faith purchaser cannot obtain valid title from a
thief or from one who acquired property from a thief. The com-
mon law rule was that "he who hath not cannot give."'199 Under
the UCC, a thief has void title and cannot convey title, good or
voidable, even to an innocent purchaser in good faith. A good-
faith purchaser lacks the power to convey valid title to property to
a successor if the property was originally stolen.2' The status of
196. Eisen, supra note 22, at 1080 (citing Petrovich, supra note 28, at 1140).
197. Drum, supra note 104, at 934-35.
198. Id. at 944.
199. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 1037.
200. According to the UCC, voidable title can be established under certain circum-
stances, but not when the goods have not been exchanged in a voluntary purchase.
U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1990). Under any definition, a thief cannot be a voluntary purchaser,
and under § 2-403, a person receiving stolen goods from a thief, or any person in the
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the innocent purchaser is irrelevant to the validity of the title."1
The rule is simple: "A sale by the thief or any other person claim-
ing under the thief does not vest any title in the purchaser as
against the owner, though the sale was made in the ordinary
course of trade and the purchaser acted in good faith."2"
This idea is in direct conflict with the discovery rule, which
not only implies that good title passes to the subsequent possessor
when the owner fails to pursue a diligent search but also places
affirmative obligations on the true owner. In theory, an original
owner should be able to recover his stolen property from any
subsequent possessor, even one who pays full price for the piece.
The discovery rule, however) mandates that the victim take addi-
tional steps to prevent the passing of title to his property, despite
the fact that under traditional law, the party in possession has no
rightful claim to the property because the thief responsible for its
distribution never had title to convey. The demand rule, on the
other hand, is consistent with the UCC notion of title, because it
confers an automatic right on true owners to demand possession of
stolen property.
Furthermore, the Guggenheim decision is in accord with the
demonstrated reluctance of politicians to create a statutory due
diligence requirement. New York Governor Mario Cuomo, just
five years before Guggenheim, vetoed a bill designed to allow
museums, and presumably other collectors, to gain valid title to
artwork after giving required public notice of acquisition and wait-
ing for a statutorily prescribed period to allow for claims. The bill
would have severed the rights of plaintiffs who are not privy to
public notices in the United States, especially those that garner
little public attention, and who might not have realized that the
artwork had resurfaced. The veto, Governor Cuomo said, was
necessary because the period specified in the bill did not provide a
"reasonable opportunity" for foreign institutions to receive notice
of the acquisition or to take action to recover the property and
line of possession of a thief, receives void title.
201. Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 918 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (holding that "a
possessor of stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired, can never convey good
title.") (citing Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1971)).
202. Suburban Motors v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 268 Cal. Rptr. 16, 19 (Ct. App.
1990) (quoting 3 RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 555 (3d ed.
1983)).
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would make New York a "haven for cultural property stolen
abroad."2 3
The demand rule is also consistent with the expressed policy
of the federal government. Just as the state courts deciding replev-
in cases have aimed to slow or stop the trade in stolen art, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in United States
v. McClain' 4 that Congress's apparent purpose in enacting stolen
property statutes with criminal penalties was to discourage both
the theft and the subsequent receipt of stolen goods.0 5 The court
further noted that "[t]he ultimate beneficiary of the law ... is the
property owner.)20 6 In McClain, the court dealt with the question
of art exported illegally from other countries in contravention of
the National Stolen Property Act.2' In determining whether the
identified property was stolen property belonging to a foreign
nation, the court held that "a declaration of national ownership is
necessary before illegal exportation of an article can be considered
theft, and the exported article considered 'stolen.' ,208 The rele-
vant similarities between a demand requirement to create wrongful
possession and a requirement that a country establish a claim of
ownership before exportation of artifacts can qualify as theft are
clear. In both cases, the demand is necessary to establish wrongful-
ness. Thus, the rationale behind New York's common law accrual
doctrine accords with federal statutory law on stolen artifacts.
203. Drum, supra note 104, at 936 (quoting Cuomo Vetoes Art Ownership Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 1986, at C14); see also Irvin Molotsky, 3 U.S. Agencies Urge Veto of Art-
Claim Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1986, at C15 ("We cannot support [the bill] because we
feel that it makes recovery of stolen art so difficult that it will encourage theft.")
(quoting Dr. Constance Lowenthal, executive director of the International Foundation for
Art Research).
The bill was opposed by the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Justice Department,
and the U.S. Information Agency because of perceived foreign policy implications. The
publication requirements of the bill were minimal, mandating either publication in a
collector's own publication, display of the object for twelve months in a 36-month period,
or inclusion of the piece in the collector's catalogue for three years. Hence, the bill was
viewed as creating an insurmountable burden for small countries or collectors who could
not be expected to subscribe to all of the publications and catalogues in which notices
might be included. Moreover, a similar measure had previously been withdrawn from the
state legislature's consideration because of concerns about the bill's ambiguity in defining
which collectors might obtain title under the statute. Id.
204. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
205. Ld. at 994.
206. Id.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988).
208. McClain, 545 F.2d at 1000-01.
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One of the most striking aspects of the Guggenheim decision
is that it finally makes a policy choice and announces favor for
one party.2" With regard to the statute of limitations, but not
the laches defense, the court clearly took a stand in favor of the
true owner. Ideally, in a state such as New York, which plays such
a vital role in the art industry, the state legislature should an-
nounce rules and shape policy clearly determining which parties
are to receive legal protection. With this decision, however, the
court was not making unwarranted intrusions into such
policymaking prerogatives. The Guggenheim court was not modify-
ing or altering any doctrine; it returned the law to an earlier and
more simplified position. The presence of political and historical
support for the court's position strengthens the efficacy of its hold-
ing."' Indeed, the demand rule is significantly similar to the ear-
ly doctrine of adverse possession of personal property as it was
applied before the importation of the discovery rule. The difficulty
of establishing open and notorious possession significant enough to
put the true owner on notice of a claim and start the statute of
limitations running meant the subsequent possessor of personal
property could rarely be expected to win. The deviation from this
rule, the discovery rule established in O'Keeffe, expanded the
opportunity for parties to defeat the true owner's claims. Hence, a
return to the demand rule is not a departure from traditional
jurisprudence or an unwarranted judicial excursion into
policymaking but a return to the original state of the law.
Another advantage of the demand rule is that of certainty.
Balancing equities is a laudable judicial goal, but in these cases, in
which innocent purchasers are threatened with the loss of million
dollar investments, certainty seems an equally laudable goal. The
discovery rule's inconsistent application hardly comports with the
required degree of certainty. With the art theft problem becoming
almost epidemic, the Guggenheim court's position, what some
209. Gary Spencer, Claim to Recover Painting Allowed, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 15, 1991, at
1-2 ("For the first time the Court of Appeals has said, as a matter of New York policy,
New York is going to favor the true owner of stolen property and is not going to allow
the mere lapse of time to cut off ownership.") (quoting Jeffrey Barist, attorney for the
Guggenheim Foundation).
210. "New York caselaw has long protected the right of the owner whose property
has been stolen to recover that property, even if it is in the possession of a good-faith
purchaser for value." Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429
(N.Y. 1991).
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might view as a harsh stance toward innocent purchasers, is entire-
ly appropriate. It is only by forcing both parties to bear a reason-
able burden of diligence 1 that equity and certainty are best
served. Without strict guidelines, the discovery rule is destined to
be decided again on appeal"
The demand rule has the added benefit of clarity; it requires
no complex or amorphous balancing, nor must the court determine
if an increase in the value of a painting should have an effect on
the equities in a replevin suit. By operation of the demand rule,
collectors, particularly institutional possessors, can be certain that
they will lose possession and receipts from exhibitions if they have
been clumsy in checking the chain of title to the works. In this
way, the clarity of the demand rule enhances the parties' under-
standing of their respective rights.
Some observers assert that the demand rule, like the discovery
rule, causes paintings to go further underground because open and
notorious use only facilitates the true owner's ability to locate the
painting and demand possession. However, the effect of the de-
mand rule in this regard may be less noticeable than that of the
discovery rule for at least two reasons. First, the requirement of
diligence under the discovery rule mandates that the true owner
make a public and thorough search for the lost item, increasing
the likelihood that the subsequent possessor will become aware of
the true owner's efforts and that he will hide the piece if he sens-
es he might lose possession of so valuable an investment. The
operation of the demand rule does not require so public a search.
Second, under the demand rule, the law does not treat the subse-
quent possession as wrongful until a demand for possession is
made. The possessor has no reason to hide the painting. By con-
trast, under the discovery rule, the subsequent possession remains
wrongful throughout the statutory period and for the duration of
the true owner's diligent efforts. The subsequent possessor in that
case has every reason to keep the piece underground. To the
211. The court did not abolish the true owner's duty of diligence in not causing an
unreasonable delay in the making of a demand once the subsequent possessor has been
found. What the Guggenheim decision eradicated was the imposition of a due diligence
standard in searching for the location of stolen property so that a demand could be
made. Id. at 427, 430.
212. See eg., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 836 F.2d
103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 405 A.2d 840
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 416 A.2d 862 (NJ. 1980).
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extent that either doctrine produces this sequestration effect, the
demand rule seems to resolve the situation more equitably by
protecting the owner with valid title in his efforts to locate the
stolen property, rather than imposing a burden on him that almost
certainly makes recovery of the stolen property impossible. Under
the discovery rule, subsequent possessors must be aware that at
some point the true owner will face the decision of whether to
abandon the effort and intensity of a diligent search and thereby
lose title to the property. The subsequent possessor gains an ad-
vantage, therefore, by hiding the painting until that point.
The demand rule as it applies in New York shifts the primary
burden of investigation to the purchaser. The true owner is not
without some obligation because, as the courts have noted, the
true owner must not unreasonably delay in making a demand on
the party in possession once he learns the whereabouts of the
213stolen piece. The remaining obligation, however, falls on the
purchaser. Of course, the rule imposes some degree of obligation
on purchasers initially in order to qualify as innocent, good-faith
purchasers.1 4 Yet, if prospective purchasers seek repose, the
Guggenheim decision thrusts upon them a higher duty of inquiry.
This result is logical because purchasers of paintings have better
opportunities to verify the provenance of works of art than owners
have in trying to locate or uncover stolen pieces. In considering a
purchase, many persons seek the aid of an art dealer who has
both the resources and the ability to investigate the validity of the
object's title and who can reasonably be expected to undertake
such an investigation. Moreover, a purchaser has the opportunity
to question the seller as to the circumstances of his acquisition of
the piece and to inquire with art registries and law enforcement
agencies as to the status of the piece. As the Goldberg court not-
ed, purchasers can examine the circumstances of the proposed pur-
chase and at least be put on notice that the property may be
stolen.215 Even if a purchaser is not technically put on notice, it
213. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107.
214. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1990); id. § 2-403(2).
215. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992). In Goldberg, the purchaser knew that the art dealer
with whom she was working had previously been convicted of forging an artist's signature
and had been sued for failing to pay an art gallery. Instead of inquiring further into his
credibility, the purchaser dealt with him anyway. Moreover, she trusted his attorney. Id.
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may not be unreasonable to expect that he be on notice that fur-
ther verification is required. Some commentators have suggested
that authorities in the art world would prefer that "as between an
innocent owner and innocent purchaser, it is the latter who should
bear the loss ... [for several reasons, including] his voluntary en-
try 'into a transaction to acquire material of a type known to be
problematic.' 12216
The burden on the purchaser seems even more defensible in
light of several other factors. The rule imposes a duty on the pur-
chaser only to the extent he desires to avoid eventual liability.
Furthermore, there is no objective level of "diligent" activity in
which the purchaser must engage before a court will recognize his
activities as sufficient to invoke a legal right. The efforts under-
taken are for the purchaser's own protection. Under the discovery
rule, however, the requirement of due diligence is a judicially
created, objective standard that stands between the true owner of
stolen property and his exercise of the right to recover that prop-
erty. A solid and well-defined notion of a diligent search is neces-
sary, but the experience of the courts has shown that this is nearly
impossible to codify.217
To the extent that the demand rule places liability on those
who purchase stolen paintings, it takes a giant step toward slowing
the art theft trade. Deterrence no doubt stems from the fact that
the purchaser stands to lose an important investment if he must
return to the true owner a stolen painting purchased for a substan-
tial sum of money: "It means that people will be less likely to buy
stolen art ... and more likely to ask questions. 2 18 Yet this is
not the only deterrent underlying the demand rule. If purchasers
are unwilling to purchase stolen items, thieves may be deterred
from frequent heists. Furthermore, the imposition of the burden
on the purchaser affects the integrity of the art market as a whole.
216. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 622 (App. Div.
1990) (quoting Stephen E. Well, Repose, 8 IFAR REPORTS, Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 6), affd,
569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
217. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431 ("[I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to
craft a reasonable diligence requirement that could take into account all of these vari-
ables[, such as the value of the stolen property, the manner of theft, and the type of
institution from which the property was stolen] .... ").
218. Sam H. Verhovek, Guggenheim May Sue for Chagall, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991,
at C7 (quoting Dr. Constance Lowenthal, executive director of the International Founda-
tion for Art Research).
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In Porter v. Wertz,219 in the context of art merchant transactions
and sales, the court noted that "commercial indifference to owner-
ship or the right to sell facilitates traffic in stolen works of art"
and that "[c]ommercial indifference diminishes the integrity and in-
creases the culpability of the apathetic merchant."'  As the
court in Goldberg noted, "Lest this result seem too harsh, we
should note that those who wish to purchase artwork on the inter-
national market, undoubtedly a ticklish business, are not without
means by which to protect themselves .... [P]rospective purchas-
ers would do best to do more than make a few last-minute phone
calls."22
1
Finally, the demand rule's anomalous favoring of the thief
over the innocent purchaser is illusory. Although the Guggenheim
court failed to explain New York's separate statutory treatment of
innocent purchasers and thieves, the effect may be a nullity. As
noted earlier, the statute does not begin to run against a thief who
has fraudulently concealed the property.222 The statute is tolled
until the owner either knows the location of the stolen property or
could have known with the exercise of effort. The thief who has
sold a stolen painting, merely by virtue of a sale unbeknownst to
the true owner, may have fraudulently concealed the whereabouts
of the painting, tolling the statute against the thief as well as the
innocent purchaser. Moreover, if, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court
suggested in Weaver v. Casey,22 identity of the defendant is an
essential element of the cause of action, the demand rule in no
way favors the thief because the statute will be tolled until the
time demand can be made.224 At any rate, the ordinary art thief
does not intend to retain the stolen property long enough to in-
yoke the statute of limitations. More often, the property will have
been sold to an innocent purchaser, against whom the state's le-
nient demand rule protects the true owner.
219. 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. Div. 1979), affd, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1981).
220. Id. at 259.
221. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 294 (7th Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
222. See supra Section I(B).
223. 816 P.2d 1126 (Ola. 1991).
224. Id. at 1130. The Guggenheim court noted that New York law provides that the
cause of action accrues at the time of the theft, regardless of whether the owner is
aware of the theft. However, it does not rule out the possibility that the statute might be
tolled if the owner does not know the identity of the thief. Solomon R. Guggenheim
Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991).
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Since few courts recognize the statute of limitations in replev-
in actions as a statute of repose in itself, but more often as an ob-
stacle to the true owner's suit, there is internal consistency to the
New York rule. In actions against the thief, the statute of limita-
tions operates to bar the true owner's remedy, but the right to
possession remains vested in the owner. In the case of inno-
cent purchasers, the statute assumes that the possession is not
wrongful and that the innocent purchaser consequently has the
right to possession. Once the possession becomes wrongful-that
is, after a demand is made-the statute of limitations becomes
applicable as a bar to the owner's remedy, just as it applies
against the thief. Because an innocent purchaser suffers no legal
exposure until he has been made aware of a pending claim, the
statutory period to which he is subject is no longer than that ap-
plicable to the thief.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts have long had difficulty determining the best meth-
od of ruling on the accrual of the statute of limitations in replevin
actions to recover stolen art. Although several approaches have
been taken, the best is the demand rule affirmed by the New
York Court of Appeals in Guggenheim. The discovery rule, which
shifts the burden of locating stolen artwork to the true owner and
forecloses the rights of the owner in the event his burden is not
met, encourages trafficking in art theft because a purchaser, re-
gardless of his good faith, can retain possession of a stolen pieie
unless the true owner maintains a vaguely defined diligent search
for the piece. The Guggenheim court's opinion that the better
policy is protection of the true owner by placement of a heavier
burden of investigation on the purchaser is a more equitable
choice. The purchaser is not left without a defense; he may assert
laches. Moreover, although the law appears facially inconsisteit in
its treatment of thieves and innocent purchasers, it is in fact not
partial to the thief. In any case, in New York at least, art collec-
tors are well-advised to "buy the piece, never the story."'
225. No action may be pursued against the thief, but the true owner retains the right
to initiate an action against the current possessor to whom the thief sold the piece.
226. Karl E. Meyer, "Buy the Piece, Never the Story," N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1989, §
4, at 22 (quoting eminent American collector Norbert Schimmel).
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